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A. Definition of a Life Insurance Company
In Superior Life Insurance Co. v. United States' the main issue
before the court was whether Superior Life Insurance Co. constituted
a life insurance company as defined in Section 801 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.2 Superior paid its income taxes as a life insur-
ance company from 1960 to 1964. In 1968 the Internal Revenue Service
demanded and received from Superior income tax deficiencies for the
period from 1960 to 1964. If Superior qualified as a life insurance
company under Section 801, the demand by the Internal Revenue
would be unfounded and Superior would be allowed recovery.
1. 322 F. Supp. 921 (D.S.C. 1971).
2. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 801 provides in part
(a) LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY DEFINED.
[T]he term "life insurance company" means an insurance company
which is engaged in the business of issuing life insurance and annuity
contracts (either separately or combined with health and accident insur-
ance), or noncancellable contracts of health and accident insurance, if-
I) its life insurance reserves (as defined in sub-section (b)), plus
2) unearned premiums, and unpaid losses (whether or not ascer-
tained), or non cancellable life, health, or accident policies not included in
life insurance reserves, comprise more than 50 per cent of its total reserves
(as defined in subsection (c)).
(b) LIFE INSURANCE RESERVES DEFINED.
1) IN GENERAL
. . . [L]ife insurance reserves mean amounts
(A) which are computed or estimated on the basis of
recognized mortality or morbidity tables and assumed rates
of interest
(B) which are set aside to mature or liquidate, either
by payment or reinsurance, future unaccrued claims arising
from life insurance, annuity, and noncancellable health and
accident insurance contracts (including life insurance or
annuity contracts combined with noncancellable health and
accident insurance) involving, at the time with respect to
which the reserve is computed, life, health, or accident conti-
gencies.
(c) TOTAL RESERVES DEFINED.
• . . [T]he term total reserve means-
1) life insurance reserves
2) unearned premiums, and unpaid losses (whether or not ascer-
tained), not included in life insurance reserves, ...
1
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Superior was engaged in the business of issuing credit life, health,
and accident insurance. Superior was a subsidiary of Stephenson Fi-
nance Co. The majority of Superior's insurance policies were sold
through Stephenson. The mechanics of the sale of insurance through
Stephenson was clearly described in the court's opinion:
When an individual borrowed money from Stephenson, he was
offered the opportunity, by the Stephenson employee making the
loan, to obtain coverage under the Group Policy. If the borrower
desired to obtain coverage under the Group Policy, the amount of
the loan from Stephenson to the borrower was increased by an
amount sufficient to pay, for the entire term of the policy, (i) the
life insurance premium and (ii) the accident and health insurance
premiums. The amount of the insurance premiums was treated as
part of the loan and the principal amount of the note of the bor-
rower to Stephenson included this amount as principal, with inter-
est being charged thereon. The proceeds of the loan which the
borrower received, did not, however, include any portion of the
insurance premiums, but rather the entire amount of the insurance
premiums was withheld by Stephenson from the proceeds of the
loan and retained by it as a reserve for premiums to become due
with respect to the Certificate of Insurance so issued. The amount
retained by Stephenson was carried on the books of Stephenson
as a liability entitled "Reserve for A & H Premiums." The
amount so withheld is referred to hereinafter as the "liability
account." 3
On the first day of the month immediately following the month in
which a Certificate of Insurance was issued, Stephenson paid to Supe-
rior (1) the life insurance premium for the entire term and (2) the first
monthly payment on the health and accident coverage. Superior main-
tained reserves on all policies issued. Mortality reserves on the life
policies were maintained in accordance with the "Commissioner's
1941 Standard Ordinary Table of Mortality". Gross unearned prem-
ium reserves were maintained on the health and accident coverage. No
reserves were maintained on the Stephenson held health and accident
premiums to become due.
The I.R.S. contended that Superior did not qualify as a life insur-
ance.company on the basis that the reserves carried on Stephenson's
books were, in fact, an unearned premium reserve of Superior. The
I.R.S. also contended that the unearned premium reserves carried by
Superior, together with the "liability account" carried by Stephenson
3. 322 F. Supp. at 925.
19711
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/13
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
did not constitute life insurance reserves so that Superior's life insur-
ance reserves did not equal more than fifty per cent of its total insur-
ance reserves as required by Section 801.4 The government made three
arguments in support of its contention that the reserves carried on
Stephenson's books should have been reported by Superior: (1) the
arrangement between Stephenson and Superior was made to avoid
taxes and therefore should not be given effect for tax purposes; (2)
Superior was deemed to have received the accident and health prem-
iums under the doctrine of "constructive receipt;" (3) the "liability
account" was properly allocable from Stephenson to Superior under
Section 482.-
As to the government's first argument the court reasoned that a
"[d]esire by Superior to reduce or avoid federal income taxes in the
normal conduct of its business, the issuance and sale of credit insur-
ance, would be not merely a legitimate consideration, but rather a
mandatory one if good business practice were to be followed."' The
court dismissed the government's contention of constructive receipt of
the "liability account" on the basis that Superior had no right to
withdraw funds for payment of the premium until the due date.7 The
court refused to apply Section 482 (to allocate the "liability account"
from Stephenson to Superior) because the Group Policy
[W]as an arm's length business arrangement, was authorized by
the statutes of South Carolina,8 was approved by the South Caro-
lina Insurance Department, and was the result of the natural con-
flict of interest existing between Superior and Stephenson, relative
to the payment and receipt of the insurance premium.9
Having dismissed each of the government's arguments which sup-
ported the contention that the "liability account" carried by Stephen-
son should have been reported by Superior, the court held that Superior
qualified as a life insurance company under Section 801 and was there-
fore entitled to relief. Although the court felt that this determination
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 801(a).
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 482 provides for the allocation of income and deduc-
tion among two or more organizations which are owned or controlled by the same
interest when the allocation, is necessary to prevent the evasion of taxes.
6. 322 F. Supp. at 929 (emphasis added).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1960) provides that the power to withdraw funds upon
demand is necessary for the doctrine of "constructive receipt" to operate.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-305 (1962).
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was sufficient to grant Superior relief, they proceeded to discuss the
issue of whether the "liability account" constituted an unearned prem-
ium reserve or an advance premium, and the issue of whether all of
Superior's reserves qualified as life insurance reserves on the basis that
they were maintained as life insurance reserves combined with health
and accident insurance."
The court indicated that the liability account would constitute an
unearned premium if reportable by Superior. If the account was an
unearned premium it would be considered part of the total insurance
reserves for the purpose of qualifying Superior as a life insurance com-
pany under Section 801. Therefore, had the court held the "liability
account" to be reportable by Superior, Superior's life insurance rese-
rves would have constituted less than 50% of the total insurance re-
serves. However, the court also indicated that since the life insurance
reserves of Superior were substantial and the life insurance policies
were combined with health and accident, all the insurance reserves of
Superior constituted life insurance reserves. It would seem, therefore,
that even if the "liability account" of Stephenson was reportable by
Superior, Superior may have still qualified as a life insurance company
under Section 801.
B. Loan Company Deduction for Loss Reserves
In Peoples Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United
States" the plaintiff-taxpayer brought an action to recover income
taxes pursuant to Section 593 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.11
The 1962 amendment to Section 593 required the taxpayer, in order
to qualify for a deduction, to "establish and maintain a reserve for
losses on qualifying real property loans, a reserve for losses on non
10. The court cited Revenue Ruling 69-270, the Internal Revenue Service, in distin-
guishing an unearned premium from an advance premium:
Unearned premiums, as defined in section 1.801-3(e) of the Regula-
tions are these amounts that cover the cost of carrying the insurance risk
proportionate to the unexpired period of the policy term, the coverage of
which began on a premium due date that is already past. On the other hand
advance premiums are amounts that have been received but are not yet due.
(Emphasis added).
322 F. Supp. at 933.
II. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 801(a).
12. 320 F. Supp. 179 (D.S.C. 1970).
13. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 593(a) provides for tax deductions for losses on
loans to "any mutual savings bank not having capital stock represented by shares .. "
1971]
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qualifying loans, and a supplemental reserve for losses on loans."" The
approved method for complying with this amendment was to record the
reserves on a general ledger and on a subsidiary ledger. The plaintiff
had followed this procedure in all the years prior to 1965, recording
the reserve account on the general and subsidiary ledgers on March 15
of each year when the income tax return was filed. In 1966, however,
the plaintiff failed to make entries of the reserves on the subsidiary
ledger until August 4. There was evidence of the reserves as the plaintiff
had computed the deductions on its tax return and had entered the loss
reserves on its general ledger on March 15 of that year.
The issue in Peoples Federal was whether the plaintiff should have
been denied a deduction because of the delay in recording the reserves
on the subsidiary ledger. According to Regulation 1.593-5(b), the re-
serve account must be recorded on the subsidiary ledger "by the close
of the taxable year or as soon as practicable thereafter."' The I.R.S.
contended that under this regulation the plaintiff was required to post
its claimed reserves in the subsidiary ledger not later than the date on
which it filed its tax return for that year. The defendant cited Rio
Grande Building and Loan Association v. Commissioner"8 in support
of its contention. In the Rio Grande case the Tax Court construed
Regulation 1.593-5(b) to mean that "generally the limit should be not
later than the time at which the taxpayer files its income tax return for
the year involved."' 7 The court in Peoples Federal distinguished the Rio
Grande Case in that the taxpayer in Rio Grande did not "either in its
tax return or on its ledger, evidence its reserve accounts for any of the
years in question.""
The plaintiff contended that the Regulation contained no fixed
time since it used the flexible phrase "as soon as practical." The court
approved this reasoning and held that the plaintiff was entitled to the
deduction and that the assessment made because of the delay in plain-
tiff's bookkeeping was improper. Although the actual holding of the
court was that there was no fixed time for recording the loss reserve
on the subsidiary ledger, the main considerations which influenced the
court in its decision were the special circumstances involved. It was
14. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 593(c)(1).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.593-5(b) (1964).
16. 36 T.C. 657 (1961).
17. 36 T.C. at 664.
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very likely that the delay was a result of the physicial illness of plain-
tiff's accountant. Also, the loss reserves had been computed on the
plaintiff's tax return and recorded on the general ledger.
C. Nonprofit Organization Exemption
In Elmwood Cemetery Association v. South Carolina Tax
Commission,19 the Tax Commission made an assessment against the
Elmwood Cemetery Association for income taxes allegedly due for the
years 1949 through 1963. Elmwood paid the tax under protest for the
year 1949 and brought an action to recover that payment on the basis
that it was "[a] non-profit cemetery corporation without capital stock,
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
stockholder or individual" 20 and therefore was exempt from payment
of income taxes under Section 65-226(3) of the 1962 Code of Laws.
2 1
Elmwood also sought a declaratory judgment relieving it from pay-
ment of taxes assessed for the years following 1949.
The court held that Elmwood could elect to pay under protest the
tax for one or more of the years and bring an action to recover the taxes
so paid, but could recover only the tax that had been paid under pro-
test. The court refused to grant a declaratory judgment for the assessed
taxes that had not been paid. Therefore, in order to be relieved from
paying taxes for the period from 1950 through 1963, Elmwood would
first have to pay under protest the taxes assessed for that period and
then bring an action to recover the taxes so paid.
The South Carolina Supreme Court explained its holding in
Elmwood in Perpetual Building & Loan Association v. South Carolina
Tax Commission2 where the court held that although a taxpayer may
elect to pay under protest the tax assessed for one year of a period of
years, he may not pay a portion of the tax for one year. For an action
to be brought under §§ 65-266123' and 65-266221 taxes assessed must be
paid under protest for at least one full year.
19. 179 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 1971).
20. Id. at 611.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-226(3) (1962) exempts eleomosynary corporations from
payment of income taxes.
22. Smith's Adv. Sht. No. 19190 (S.C., Mar. 24, 1971).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2661 (1962).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2662 (1962).
1971]
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I I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES
A. Special Student Fee to Pay for Football Stadium
In Moye v. Board of Trustees2 an action was brought by a resi-
dent student of the University of South Carolina and his father, a
resident and taxpayer of South Carolina, on their own behalf and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, asking the court to declare un-
constitutional a 1970 Act2" which authorized the issuance of five mil-
lion dollars of Special Obligation Bonds for improving the University
of South Carolina football stadium. Paymentj of principal and interest
on the bonds was to be made through a "special student fee" imposed
upon students of the university.
The plaintiffs' main argument was that the act was unconstitu-
tional in that the "special student fee" constituted a tax which violated
Article X, Section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution, which
provides for a uniform and equal rate of taxation.
The circuit court reasoned that the special student fee did not come
under the definition of a tax, "an obligation for support of the govern-
ment as a whole, a contribution to the public treasury out of which are
paid all general expenses of government." ' Although the supreme
court.did not agree with this definition, it affirmed the holding of the
circuit court on the basis that the impositio i of the student fee came
under the statutory authority26 of the Board) of Trustees. The student
was not being taxed, but was simply paying a fee which was lawfully
required of him for the privilege of attending the university.
B. Exemption for South Carolina Public Srvice Authority
In Morgan v. Watts29 the plaintiff taxpayer challenged the consti-
tutionality of Act No. 432 of 1969, Section 18,20 on the basis that it
25. 177 S.E.2d 137 (S.C. 1970).
26. 566 S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2724 (1970).
"An Act To Empower The Trustees Of The University of Carolina
To Issue Special Obligation Bonds To Pay For The Cost Of Enlarging
And Improving Carolina Stadium; To Prescribe The Conditions Under
Which Such Bonds May Be Issued And To Make Provision For The
Payment Thereof."
27. 177 S.E.2d at 138.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104 (1962).
29. 178 S.E.2d 147 (S.C. 1970).
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undertook to exempt privately owned property from taxation. Section
18 provides that "all property leased to and operated by the South
Carolina Public Service Authority for the generation or transmission
of electric power shall, for all tax purposes, be considered the property
of the Authority."
'3'
The property in question consisted of electrical facilities leased to
the Authority by Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. Although
the court recognized that in effect Central was merely a conduit
through which the Authority was financing the purchase of the systems,
the property was considered leased property for the purpose of deciding
the issue.
The plaintiff invoked Article X, Section 1 of the South Carolina
Constitution which provides for a uniform and equal rate of assessment
and taxation. The court reasoned that the generation and transmission
of electric power by the Authority was a public function and held,
therefore, that the property leased by the Authority came under the
''municipal purposes" exception to the equality requirement of Article
X. The court further held that Sections 432 and 53 of Article.X did not
prohibit the legislature from creating exemptions not included in those
sections. The court also dismissed plaintiff's contention that Section 18
of the 1969 Act was a special law where a general law could be made
applicable as prohibited in Article III, Section 34 of the South Caro-
lina Constitution.3 The court held that the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose "by legislation tailored to meet the peculiar needs
of this agency is not within the evil of special and local legislation which
the framers sought to remedy by Article I II, Section 34."5
III. ESTATE TAX-MARITAL DEDUCTION
In Burnett v. United States36 the plaintiff-executrix brought an
action to recover estate taxes paid, claiming that the gift under her
husband's will qualified for a marital deduction as provided in the
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-8 (1962).
32. S.C. CoNsT. art. 10, § 4 provides for the exemption of various properties.
33. S.C. CoNsT. art. 10 § 5 provides for exemptions from taxes levied for corpor-
ate purposes.
34. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 34.
35. Id.
36. 314 F. Supp. 492 (D.S.C. 1970).
1971]
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Internal Revenue Code.31 The district court noted that state law deter-
mines the quality and quantity of the surviving spouse's title under a
will while federal law determines whether such interest qualifies for a
marital deduction. 38 The court applied South Carolina law in its inter-
pretation of the will and held that the plaintiff had been given a life
estate without the power to make a gift of the devised property. With-
out the power to make a gift of the life estate, an allowance of a marital
deduction under Section 2056(5) of the Internal Revenue Code could
not be granted.
J. FRANK MCCLAIN
37. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056.
38. In presenting this as a settled proposition of law, the court cited Pierpont v.
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